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I.

DEFENDANTS5 ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE
CONVENIENCE TO THE DOMINANT ESTATE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n construing any grant of right of way the

use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to
the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use
contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). Defendants have alleged
that the record shows many instances where it is clear that the trial court did in fact consider
what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate. In reviewing the
evidence presented at trial, the court will apply the clear error standard which means,
Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ or the
appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made'."
Power Systems & Controls, Inc., v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); quoting In re T.R.F., 760 p.2d 906, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In this case, the clear
weight of the evidence demonstrates that the trial court failed to consider what was
reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff.
First, Defendants cite paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial court
concluded "[i]t would be extremely difficult to move a front-end loader or truck from the
Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to the Plaintiffs property on the particular [Gravel Pit]
road." R. at 157: 10. Although Defendants argue that this statement "considers what is
reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff," the court has utterly failed to note that
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the inconvenience created by this difficulty is negligible compared with the difficulty of
moving a front-end loader or truck to Plaintiffs property from the east on the "East Road,"
where the court actually granted an easement. The difficulties of navigating any portion of
the Gravel Pit Road are negligible to the Plaintiff compared with the difficulties he would
encounter trying to reach his property on what has been termed the "East Road."
For example, the evidence presented at trial makes clear that the East Road is
"impassable" and that "[f]or a truck, a semi or a loaded, load of equipment of any kind to
haul materials in there from the east side would be totally impossible." R. at 40: 7-20. This
testimony was not rebutted. No evidence was presented that any heavy equipment had ever
traversed the "East Road" to Plaintiffs property. It is clear from the record that the Gravel
Pit Road is not only reasonably necessary to access the Plaintiffs' property with heavy
equipment, but it is clearly the only passable, and therefore the only convenient route for
Plaintiffs' use.
Second, Defendants cite paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial court
stated "[a] substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road through
Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks
Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of
Plaintiffs property." R. at 158. While it is true that it would take a substantial amount of
work to place a permanent road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit, it is clear from the
record that a substantially greater amount of work would be needed to cut a road to access
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Plaintiffs property from the east, in order to create or finish the proposed East Road.
Specifically, Plaintiff proffered the testimony of Mr. Cartwright who estimated that it would
cost approximately $24,000 to improve the north access road [North Road] and "if somebody
were somehow miraculously to cut a roadfrom the east it would be even double that." R. at
549: 4-10. This testimony was not rebutted. The trial court completely failed to consider
which route would be reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff and simply
focused its attention on the alleged difficulties Defendants alleged with access via the Gravel
Pit Road.
Finally, the defendants cite paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial
court specifically noted "[t]hat road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has not served as the
primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to 1963, when
the Gravel Pit Road was built." R. at 158, emphasis added. Whether or not the road has
served as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property is irrelevant. Whether the
road served as the primary entrance to Plaintiffs property (which is relevant) was not even
considered by the Court in its findings. The Plaintiff does not deny the fact that a portion of
the road has fallen into disrepair. However, it is important to clarify the reason why a
portion of the road has fallen into disrepair. The cause of action before the court was not
solely an action for the determination of an easement. A forcible detainer action was also
brought before the court in which the trial court held that "it is clear that Plaintiff is entitled
to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. Because Plaintiff was forcibly detained from
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access to his property, he has been unable to maintain the above-stated portion of road. The
trial court has failed to consider what is reasonably necessary and convenient to Plaintiff.

II.

THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION THAT THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE EAST ROAD IS THE MOST
TRAVERSED ROAD IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
The Defendants correctly cited the standard of review as clear error. See Br. of

Appellees at 10. Under the clear error standard, Plaintiff "must show that the findings are
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems & Controls, Inc., v. Keith's
Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); quoting In re T.R.K, 760 p.2d 906,
90 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendants admitted that contradictory evidence was
presented at trial, as should be expected. See Br. of Appellees at 14. However, in
considering all the evidence presented at trial, the clear weight does not support the position
that the East Road is the most traversed Road. See Br. of Appellees at 14. Each of
Plaintiffs responses to the Defendants' brief will be dealt with in turn below.
A.

DESPITE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTIONS, PLAINTIFF DISCLOSED
CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE EAST ROAD IS NOT THE MOST
TRAVERSED ROAD

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not disclosed all of the evidence in the record that
supports the fact that the East Road is the most traversed road. See Br. of Appellees at 14.
Defendants have alleged that Plaintiff has understated the evidence which was supplied
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regarding the suitability of the East Road. See Br. of Appellees at 14. Defendants provided
a list of items which they allege were understated by the Plaintiff. However, not only has the
Plaintiff addressed the evidence mentioned in the Defendant's brief, but the Plaintiff has also
shown the lack of credibility associated with said evidence.
For example, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not disclosed or has
understated the comment by Mr. Robinson that he had "seen people travel [the East Road] all
the time." See Br. of Appellees at 14. Despite the Defendants' claim, the issue was directly
addressed by Plaintiff and not taken out of context as was done by the Defendants. The
Plaintiff clearly noted that Mr. Robinson stated "every night you can see lights out there and
I've seen people travel it all the time." See Br. of Aplt. at 10. In considering the weight of
the evidence, the testimony of Mr. Robinson's remains at issue. The Defendants have
understated and failed to disclose that Mr. Robinson's observation was made from his farm
at night from "a mile and a half or two miles" away, and that Mr. Robinson had only been on
the East Road twice. R. at 491: 7-11.
In determining what weight to give evidence presented in this case, the Defendants
correctly state that is not the quantity of evidence that ultimately determines whether the trial
court was correct, it is the quality of the evidence that was presented. See Br. of Appellees at
15. In this case, both the quantity and the quality of the evidence clearly show that the trial
court's determination that the East Road was the most traversed was made against the weight
of the evidence.
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The Plaintiff marshaled evidence which clearly demonstrates that the Gravel Pit Road
is the most traversed road and that the trial court's decision was against the weight of the
evidence. The State of Utah and Millard County have used the Gravel Pit Road with large
trucks to remove sand and gravel. R. at 145: 6. In fact, the State of Utah and Millard
County graded the road leading into the sand and gravel pit during removal operations. Id.
For this reason, Mr. Edwards described the Gravel Pit road as a graded and good road. R. at
349: 13-14.
Additionally, Mr. Edwards described the regular use of the Gravel Pit Road by
testifying that "Up to the time the gate was locked, there was . . . trucks in and out of there
[the Gravel Pit Road] the biggest, big part of the time, sometimes every day, sometimes
maybe only once a week, but when we were hauling for Carlings we hauled every day
about.55 R. at 363: 23-24; R. at 364: 1-3.
Finally, the evidence clearly showed that the Gravel pit road is the only road a truck
could travel to reach the Plaintiffs property. R. at 349: 22-23. With regard to the East
Road, Mr. Edwards testified that the East Road was steeper than the Gravel Pit road, saying,
"For a truck, a semi or a leader, loaded, load of equipment of any kind to haul material in
there from the east side would be totally impossible.55 R. at 346: 7-14. Defendants offered
no evidence that any truck could use the East Road to travel the entire distance to the
Plaintiffs property. Mr. McBride testified that trucks have traveled the portion of the East
Road leading to the Carling gravel pit (which is within ten feed of McBride lane), but no
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witness testified ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East Road, which is
between two and three miles in length. Traffic seen near the East Road by Mr. Robinson
was limited to his observation of lights seen at night from his farm a mile and a half or two
miles west of the East Road. R. at 184: 11-13; R. at 184: 8. The weight of the evidence
clearly does not suggest that large equipment, as would be used by Plaintiff, has been seen
"chasing around" the East Road during the day or at night.
B.

CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED
PLAIN ERROR IN ACCEPTING MR. MCBRIDE'S AND MR.
ROBINSON'S TESTIMONY THAT THE EAST ROAD WAS "WELL
USED" OR "WELL TRAVELED"

The Supreme Court has held that u[a]bsent a timely objection, we will review an
alleged error only it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v.
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989); citing Utah R. Evid. 103(d); State v. Eldredge, 773
P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989); and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). Specifically
the Court has determined that the "requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be
'plain,' i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should have
been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error. State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35
(Utah 1989); citing State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2nd 113, 117—18, 441 P.2d 512; 514—15 (1968),
appeal after remand, 24 Utah 2nd 335, 471 P.2d 870 (1970). The premise of this rule is that
"the ends of justice must not be lost sight of in the pursuit of procedural regularity and that
when an error is plain, a trial court can legitimately be said to have had a reasonable
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opportunity to address and correct it, even in the absence of an objection. Id. at 36. The
second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. Id.; citing State v.
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985).
In this case the ends of justice would be lost and Plaintiffs rights would be
substantially affected if the Court were not to review the objection that there was no
foundation for the statements of Mr. McBride and Mr. Robinson that the East Road was
"well used." First, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. None of
Defendants' witnesses gave testimony with regard to the East Road of the quality of Glayde
Edwards' testimony regarding the use of the Gravel Pit Road. No witness designated the sort
of traffic that might have used the East Road frequently. No comparison of any objective
measurement was made between the East Road and the Gravel Pit Road.
The Defendants have alleged that adequate foundation was laid. With regards to Mr.
McBride's statement that the East Road was a well used road, the Defendants simply allege
that Mr. McBride owned the property at issue and was extremely familiar with the geography
of the area and had been on the property. However, at no point did Mr. McBride give
estimates vehicular or other traffic on the East Road. He simply stated that it was well used
and a good road. R. at 504:1. Additionally, Mr. McBride testified that trucks have traveled
the portion of the East Road leading to the Carling gravel pit (which is within ten feed of

McBride lane), but no witness testified ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East
Road, which is between two and three miles in length.
Additionally, the Defendants have claimed that proper foundation existed for Mr.
Robinson's testimony that the East Road is well traveled because Mr. Robinson had been on
the East Road one month prior to the trial. Br. of Appellees at 16. However, Defendants
have understated Mr. Robinson's testimony by failing to mention that Mr. Robinson never
testified to having seen traffic travel the East Road, except late at night, "chasing around."
Defendants also failed to mention that Mr. Robinson had never been on the East Road prior
to his single experience one month before the trial. Mr. Robinson gave no estimate of daily,
weekly, monthly, or annual vehicular or other traffic on the East Road. He gave no
information regarding actual vehicles seen during his single visit to the East Road. The only
testimony of travel on the East Road provided by Mr. Robinson was his observation of lights
seen at night from his farm a mile and a half or two miles west of the East Road. R. at 184:
11-13; R. at 184: 8. It can be legitimately said, that with all the evidence presented, that the
trial court had a reasonable opportunity to address and correct foundational questions, which
it failed to do.
Second, the plain error committed by the trial court clearly affects the substantial
rights of the Plaintiff. As a result of the unfounded testimony of Mr. McBride and Mr.
Robinson, the trial court determined that the East Road is the most traversed road.
Unfortunately, the simple truth is that the East Road - along the length Plaintiff would be

required to use - is impassable. As a result of the trial court's decision, Plaintiff is still
unable to access his property with heavy equipment. Plaintiff simply cannot access his
property with heavy equipment via the East Road. He could, however, access his property
via the Gravel Pit Road, despite the small difficulties noted in the Gravel Pit Road by the
trial court.
Plaintiff has incurred significant losses as the result of being unable to access his
property. He spent at least $37,754.41 in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction
material in anticipation of business activities on his property which Defendants' actions have
prevented him from pursuing. (R. at 148: 18).
C.

DESPITE THE ASSERTIONS OF DEFENDANTS, THE TESTIMONY OF
MR. ROBINSON CLEARLY INDICATES THAT PORTIONS OF THE
EAST ROAD NO LONGER EXIST

Defendants have argued that Plaintiff has merely pulled excerpts of testimony from
the record out of context to create an issue that, upon more careful examination of the record,
does not exist. Br. of Appellees at 16. However, a careful examination of Mr. Robinson's
testimony reveals that not only is his testimony inconsistent, but that, many portions of the
East Road referenced to in Mr. Robinson's testimony no longer exist. The difficulty in
evaluating the testimony of Mr. Robinson involves a web of constantly changing trails on the
East side of Plaintiff s property.
First, Mr. Robinson controverted his own testimony by describing the East Road (for
hunting purposes as the 'road that don't exist'" (R. at 489: 18-19) and at the same time
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describing the East Road as a "good road." R. at 483: 16-19, 22. There are trails to the East
of Plaintiff s property that can be described as "good," however, the majority of the trail
system is correctly described as a web of changing trails, many of which no longer exist. A
closer examination of Mr. Robinson testimony reveals the condition of the east portion of the
East Road to which Mr. Robinson stated "Well, at the east end don't exist." R. at 489: 2021. This portion of the East Road had been closed off close to the Davies' dairy. See R. at
490: 1-2.
The Defendants would have the Court believe that despite the extensive web of
changing trails, a constant path remains. This conclusion is simply not supported by the
weight of the evidence. Defendant McBride stated that the East Road had been blocked off
in about 1970 when the dairy was built across the road. See R. at 513: 11-16. Defendant
McBride then classified the east trail system as a "good road" to Plaintiffs property.
Specifically, the trail to Plaintiffs property was described as "[tjhere's the McBride Lane
over here and this ... gravel pit around here this road back to [Plaintiffs] property." R. at
513: 21-23. This "over here" then "around here" then "back to" description highlight the
elaborate web of changing trails to the east of Plaintiff s property.
Interestingly, Defendant McBride described, as part of the East Road, a path which, at
one point, passes directly through a third-party's gravel pit. The trial court specifically noted
its concern with the Gravel Pit Road by stating "[t]here is no defined road through the
Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it constantly changes as trucks and other equipment
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move through the pit to remove sand and gravel.55 R. at 146: 10, 147: 10; It is unclear how a
path which passes directly through a third-party's gravel pit will resolve tlie above-stated
concern.
In this case, the web of changing trails do not and have not provided a consistent path
to Plaintiffs property. Mr. Edwards described the East Road as "a four-wheel drive road or
an ATV trail, 'used to be a wagon road5 but that 'you couldn't haul on it5.55 R. at 346: 15-17.
At no point, have Defendants produced any evidence that the entire East Road trail system to
the Plaintiffs property is passable at all. The weight of the evidence clearly suggests
otherwise.
In contrast to the web of changing trails to the east of Plaintiff s property, the Gravel
Pit Road has been an established road since at least 1958 as seen in the aerial photographical
map taken in 1958. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8. (Addendum "A55 provides the court
record of all exhibits which were admitted at trial). Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 9 clearly
shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1965. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10
clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1974. Plaintiffs5 Trial Exhibit
No. 11 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1983. Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 12 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1993. Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibit No. 13 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1993. In
contrast, the above-listed exhibits clearly demonstrated web of changing trails to the east of
Plaintiffs property, many of which no longer exist.

D.

DESPITE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, MR. EDWARDS TESTIMONY IS
CONSEQUENTIAL

As mentioned above, the Defendants have correctly stated that it is not the quantity of
evidence that ultimately determines whether the trial court was correct; it is the quality of the
evidence. The Defendants have admitted that evidence they presented at trial contradicts the
evidence of Mr. Edwards. The testimony of Mr. Edwards should not be dismissed as
inconsequential simply because it is contradicted by other evidence. The quality of Mr.
Edward's testimony is demonstrated in its specificity and its reference to experience over a
period of time. The quality of Mr. Edwards' testimony greatly exceeds that of the
Defendants' witnesses, was not controverted, and was consistent.
The testimony of Mr. Edwards demonstrates that the decision of the trial court was
clearly erroneous because it was against the weight of the evidence. Mr. Edwards, who is
experienced in road work and heavy equipment travel, (R. at 339: 1-24) testified that "[u]p to
the time the gate was locked, there was ... trucks in and out of there [the Gravel Pit Road]
the biggest, big part of the time, sometimes every day, sometimes maybe only once a week,
but when we were hauling for Carlings we hauled every day about. (R. at 362: 23-24; R. at
363: 1-3). He further testified that the Gravel Pit Road was "the only road [trucks] could
haul on." (R. at 363:8). In contrast to the Gravel Pit Road, Mr. Edwards testified that from
the east, "For a truck, a semi or loaded, load of equipment of any kind to haul material in
there from the east side would be totally impassable" (R. at 346:11-14).

Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs concluding paragraph of Point II of
Plaintiffs brief draws unsupported conclusions and should be ignored. See Br. of Appellees
at 20. Plaintiff notes that Defendants never offered any evidence that a truck could use the
East Road to travel the entire distance to Plaintiffs property. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. To
refute this statement, Defendants refer to the testimony of Mr. Robinson's nightly
observation of lights from his farm a mile and a half to two miles away in which he
concluded that the lights were those of trucks. R. at 490: 14-19. However, at no point have
Defendants offered any evidence that trucks have been seen traveling the entire distance of
the East Road to the Plaintiffs property. Rather, the vehicles where simply seen "chasing
around." R. at 491: 11.
Moreover, Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs classification of vehicles which were
described as "chasing around" must have been "light vehicles of a recreational nature
(ATV's for example)" is self-serving and lacks foundation. See Br. of Appellees at 20. No
foundation was ever laid for Mr. Robinson's unique ability to determine the existence of a
truck, car, or ATV simply by viewing headlights at night from at about a mile and a half to
two miles away.
III.

DESPITE THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO ALLOW AN EASEMENT
ON THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD
The Defendants have argued eight different reasons why the record supports the trial

court's decision not to allow an easement on the gravel pit road. See Br. of Appellees at 21-
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26. Each of the Defendants' contentions on this point will be dealt with in turn below. In
discussing the eight points, it is important to point out that the clear error standard, which is,
that the Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made'." Power Systems, 765 P.2d at 9. In this case, the trial court's decision not to allow an
easement through the Gravel Pit Road is against the clear weight of the evidence.
First, the Defendants argued that Plaintiff should not be granted access through the
Gravel Pit Road because Plaintiff has failed to take the substantial steps necessary haul
gravel and conduct mining operations. See Br. of Appellees at 21. It is unclear how this
assertion relates to Plaintiffs convenience in accessing his property. However, the trial court
found that Plaintiff spent $37,754.41 in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction
materials for a structure on the property, but somehow concluded that the expenditure was
not a "substantial step." R. at 148: 18; R. at 149: 18. Specifically, the trial court determined
that while the Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and gravel,
build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that Plaintiff
failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by obtaining the
required permits, or entering into contracts. However, any lack of action on the part of
Plaintiff can be attributed directly to Defendants, as the result of Defendants' forcible
detainer. In regards to the forcible detainer action, the trial court simply concluded that "it is
clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152.
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Second, the Defendants appear to refute Plaintiffs argument that the East Road "does
not support heavy vehicular traffic." Br. of Appellees at 22. Defendants support their
argument by stating that Mr. Robinson testified that he had seen "cars or pickup . . . [o]r
bigger trucks" traveling on the East Road. Br. of Appellees at 22. Again, the Defendants
have understated and failed to disclose all of Mr. Robinson testimony. Specifically, Mr.
Robinson's observations were made at night from his farm a mile and a half to two miles
away and his testimony was based on his unique ability to decipher the nature of headlights
from a large distance at night. R. at 490: 14-19. The clear weight of Mr. Robinson's
testimony does not support the finding that the East Road is suitable for heavy vehicular
traffic required by Plaintiff.
Third, Defendants attack Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is the only
convenient access to Plaintiffs property. However, their refutation simply analyzes the
burden to the Defendants as the result of Plaintiff s use of the Gravel Pit Road. Again, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n construing any grant of right of way the use, in
character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the
dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use
contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161 P.1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). The trial court completely
ignored what is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate.
Fourth, Defendants appear to refute Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is
the only convenient location for an easement because it is a well-maintained road. To
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support their argument, Defendants first point out that the problems with the portion of the
Gravel Pit Road leading away from the gravel pit and the detriment to the Defendants' estate.
See Br. of Appellees at 23. Problems leading away from the gravel pit are a result of
disrepair and lack of maintenance as a result of the Plaintiff being forcibly detained from
access to his property. The detriments to the Defendants will be discussed at length latter.
Neither statements refute Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is the most convenient
location for an easement.
Additionally, Defendants note that there is no defined road through the sand and
gravel pit because it constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit
to remove sand and gravel pit. Br. of Appellees at 23. Surprisingly, with the constant
changes noted above, the record does not reflect any difficulties the Defendants themselves
have had in using the Gravel Pit Road, nor does the record show that any other party,
including Plaintiff, has ever complained about difficulty in using the Gravel Pit Road.
Further, Defendants noted that the trial court found that a "substantial amount of work
would be required to place a permanent road through Defendant's sand and gravel pit and
make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from
Defendant's pit onto the North West Corner of Plaintiff s property." However, as noted in
Plaintiffs brief, the trial court has committed clear error by simply failing to address or
consider what would be the most convenient to the Plaintiff. While it is correct to state that
work will be needed to improve the Gravel Pit Road to the Plaintiffs property, the record
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clearly indicates that it would cost considerably less to improve the Gravel Pit Road than to
construct a passable road from the east.
Fifth, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff has in someway mischaracterized a public
hearing held in 1999 which considered the use of the Gravel Pit Road. See Br. of Appellee
at 24. The record speaks for itself and clearly demonstrates that the use of the Gravel Pit
Road was discussed. The Defendants would suggest that the hearing addressed the "rampant
problem of trespassing," (Br. of Appellees at 24) however, the trial court specifically stated
that contentions existed regarding "trespassers and access." R. at 146: 9. A determination
was made following that hearing that the Gravel Pit Road was not a county road. R. at 146:
9.
Sixth, the Defendants objected to the proffered testimony of Mr. Cartwright which
clearly highlights the extensive cost associated with the improvement of the East Road. Br.
of Appellees at 24. Specifically, Mr. Cartwright's estimated that it would cost approximately
$24,000 to improve the north access road [North Road] and "if somebody were somehow
miraculously to cut a roadfrom the east it would be even double that" R. at 549: 4-10.
Although the Defendants argue that "during the trial, the court was presented with evidence
from several sources regarding the condition of all the roads" (Br. of Appellees at 24) no
evidence was ever presented by Defendants which addressed the cost of clearing or
constructing the East Road versus the cost of repairing the Gravel Pit Road. Additionally, no
testimony was offered to rebut the testimony of Mr. Cartwright that the cost of repairing the
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East Road would be extensive. The trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous because it
failed to consider the convenience to Plaintiff with regards to the costs associated with
repairing the East Road.
Seventh, Defendants argue that the record supports the trial court's decision not to
allow Gravel Pit Road access in the testimony of Mr. Robinson that the final stretch of the
Gravel Pit Road leading into Plaintiffs property was "possible but its just really rough." R.
at 492: 5. It is understandable that the final stretch from the Gravel Pit Road to Plaintiffs
property would be rough. Plaintiff has been forcibly detained from access to this route and
has been unable to make repairs to a very limited stretch of the Gravel Pit Road. The trial
court clearly ruled that Plaintiff had been denied access to his properly and that it is clear that
he is "entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. However, as noted above, the
testimony of Mr. Cartwright clearly suggest that the cost of repairing the Gravel Pit Road
would be considerably less than construction of the East Road.
Finally, the Defendants suggest that the testimony of Mr. Edwards that "the repair or
construction of the East Road for the Plaintiffs purposes is not feasible because the East
Road traverses the property of third parties who are not parties to this action" (Br. of
Appellees at 13) falls short of mustering an appropriate amount of evidence to show clear
error. Interestingly, the Defendants do not refute the testimony of Mr. Edwards on this point.
Thus, in considering the weight of the evidence presented on this point, it is important to
note that no contrary evidence was even presented by the Defendants to suggest the
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feasibility of repairing or constructing the East Road. The lack of evidence presented by the
Defendants on this point further demonstrates that the trial court's decision was made against
the clear weight of the evidence.
IV.

DESPITE THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AN EASEMENT
THROUGH THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD WOULD PRESENT AN EXCESSIVE
BURDEN TO DEFENDANTS
Again, the Utah Supreme Court had held that, "In construing any grant of right of

way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and
convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible
for the use contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161P.1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). This rule clearly
contemplates that some burden to the servient estate will exist.
In this case, the trial court, instead of considering what is reasonably necessary and
convenient to the dominant estate, focused its analysis on the burdens to the servient estate.
While an easement through the Gravel Pit Road might create a slight burden on the
Defendants, no evidence was presented that the burden would be excessive. Additionally,
any burden which might be speculated to accrue to the Defendants by granting access via the
Gravel Pit Road would enure to third-party owners of property surrounding the East Road if
access is affirmed from the east, which property owners have not previously allowed heavy
equipment to traverse their property, and who are not parties to this action.
Defendants argue that placing the easement on the Gravel Pit Road creates obstacles
for the Defendants in trying to prevent trespass and theft. Br. of Appellees at 28.
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Defendants offered the testimony of Sheriff Phillips who testified that he had received
complaints from Defendants regarding trespassing on the property, specifically, where
Plaintiff was involved. R. at 499; 13-21, 501: 5-8 and 504: 22-25. Again, the Defendants
have understated and failed to disclose all relevant facts. The Plaintiff was never cited or
arrested for trespass and when the Sheriff made contact with Plaintiff, he was "on his [own]
property." R. at 505:1-15. The single trespass incident involving Plaintiff was Plaintiffs
attempt to gain access to his own property from which he was being forcibly detained by
Defendants. R. at 152. This testimony does not show that an easement through the Gravel
Pit Road would increase trespass. No evidence was presented that providing an easement
through the Gravel Pit Road would increase trespass. No testimony was presented that the
Plaintiff would negligently leave a gate open or unlocked. No testimony was presented to
indicate that Plaintiff would engage in theft if provided access to his property via the Gravel
Pit Road.
Further, Defendants have alleged that granting Plaintiff access to the Gravel Pit Road
would in some way decrease the value to Defendants' property. Br. of Appellees at 27.
Specifically, Defendant Jack McBride was asked "if there is access across your property, if
the access, if an easement were granted right in the middle of your property would that make
your property in your opinion less valuable?" R. at 539: 6-10. To which, Defendant
McBride answered "[l]ess valuable for the future." R. at 539: 11. It is important to note that
Defendant McBride did not specify as to how much value would be lost. Defendants offered
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no other testimony to support Defendant McBride's assertion that said property would be
less valuable "in the future."
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the rule expounded in Morris contemplates that
some burden will exist to the servient estate. The burden should be as little burdensome as
possible while still providing access that is reasonably necessary and convenient to the
dominant estate. In this case, the trial court committed clear error by failing to considering
the access reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate, and simply attempted
to eliminate any burden to the servient estate. The trial court should have balanced its
findings on what access is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate with
the use which is as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible.
V.

DESPITE THE ASSERTION OF THE DEFENDANTS THAT PLAINTIFF
CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES, SECTION 78-36-10(2) OF THE UTAH CODE
MANDATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRANT DAMAGES FOR
SUCCESSFUL FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTIONS.
The Defendants have correctly noted that "[b]ecause the adequacy of damages is a

question of fact, [a reviewing court] cannot overturn the trial court's findings unless they are
clearly erroneous." In re Estate of Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah
1996). Additionally, section 78-36-10(2) of the Utah Code provides that "The jury or the
court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: . . . (b) forcible or
unlawful detainer. (Emphasis added).

In this case, the Plaintiff was forcibly detained from access to his property by the
Defendants, and was entitled to recover damages. The trial court correctly found that "It is
clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored to access to his land." R. at 152. However, the
trial court declined to provide damages stating that the Plaintiff has failed to provide the
court with enough evidence for the court to award damages (R. at 152) even though the trial
court specifically found that Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and
construction materials in an amount of $37,754.41. R. at 149.
Compensatory damages may be recovered in a forcible detainer case as in any other
tort. An analysis of this is set forth in Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944) in the
concurring opinion of Justice Larsen. The damages complained of in the present case for
interest on amounts spent by the Plaintiff for equipment and construction materials are
analogous to the examples of damages noted as permitted for interference with business
prospects.
The interest is compensatory damage which occurred as the result of Defendants'
conduct. Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs use of the materials which he purchased
exclusively for use on the subject property. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 931,
Division 13, Chapter 47, Topic 3, Compensatory Damages, clause (b). Although when
Plaintiff recovers possession of his land and is able to access the same, he will then be able
to make use of the purchased equipment, he has been deprived of that value for a known
period of time. The interest is an easily determined value which is a consequence of having
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been deprived of access to his property. Plaintiff has been forcibly detained frbm his
property at least since December of 2002 when Defendants erected the fences set forth in the
Findings of Fact, paragraph 3. The equipment and construction materials had been
purchased prior to that time. Interest accruing at 10% per annum (U.C.A. §15-1-1) on
$37,754.41 from December of 2002 through November of 2003 is $11,326.32.
Plaintiff also incurred attorney's fees in filing suit to cure the unlawful detainer.
Plaintiff was not allowed to present any evidence of attorney's fees incurred in restoring
access to land from which he had been forcibly detained.
The trial court stated "[w]hile Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine,
haul sand and gravel, build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented
also showed that Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these
desires a reality by obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts." R. at 152.
The Record shows, however, that Plaintiff did obtain a Mineral Lease in 1999, obtained a
well permit in 2001, and has an owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the
property. R. at 148. Requiring the Plaintiff to have entered into contracts in order to be liable
for any damage, when Defendants had begun setting fences depriving Plaintiff of access to
his property as early as September, 1998, (R. at 450) is not reasonable.
A person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either: (1) by force or by menaces and
threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any real property, whether
the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise. § 78-36-2 U.C.A. The trial court clearly
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held that "Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. A forcible
detainer does not require a Plaintiff to take substantial step to be entitled to damages. A
forcible detainer action only requires the defendant be guilty of a forcible detainer. Because
the Defendants were held to have forcibly detained Plaintiff from access to his property, the
statute mandates the assessment of damages. The trial court committed clear error by failing
to do so.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court's
Ruling was clearly erroneous in the following regards:
1.

Considering only what was burdensome to the servient estate, and failing to address

or consider the issue what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate.
2.

Finding that the East Road is "the most traversed road."

3.

After determining that Plaintiff had been forcibly detained from his property since

1999, failing to award Plaintiff damages as mandated by statute.
Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the final judgment of the trial court, including
granting the Plaintiff reasonably necessary and convenient access to his property, together
with damages and attorney fees from Defendant's forcible detainer.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of November 2005

WILFORD N.HANSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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